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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT L. VAUGHN and G. JEANIE
VAUGHN,
Argument Priority 15
Plaintiffs,
vs.
KENT A. HOGGAN and MAPLE OAKS,
L.C.,

Case No. 950390-CA

Defendants.
MAPLE OAKS, L.C.,
Third-party Plaintiff,
vs.
BOUNTIFUL CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Third-Party Defendant.

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(k) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a breach of contract action, in which the Vaughns seek specific performance
of a contract with Maple Oaks, L.C., and Kent Hoggan, or an award of damages for alleged
1

breaches thereof. The Vaughns, Maple Oaks and Kent Hoggan, entered into a contract on
March 9, 1994, pursuant to which the Vaughns agreed to dedicate a portion of a lot they
believed they owned to Bountiful City, to be used as a public street (the subject property is
referred to as the "Road Right-of-Way"), and to provide additional access to a subdivision
being developed by Maple Oaks and Hoggan. Maple Oaks paid the Vaughns $5,000 and
agreed to construct various improvements to the Road Right-of-Way and the Vaughns'
adjacent lot. Commencing on approximately July 20, 1994, the Vaughns began asserting that
Maple Oaks and Hoggan had defaulted under the Agreement by failing to perform various
duties and obligations thereunder. On August 16, 1994, the Vaughns, through their counsel,
declared that the Agreement was rescinded, due to breach by Maple Oaks and Hoggan, and
returned the $5,000 the Vaughns had been paid.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

The Vaughns filed this action on September 15, 1994. R. 1-6. In their Amended
Complaint, the Vaughns sought an order declaring that the contract was binding and
enforceable, and granting them specific performance thereof, or, alternatively, an award of
damages for Defendants' alleged breach. R. 7-21. The Vaughns' Amended Complaint also
alleged a claim against John Does 1-5 for tortious interference with their contract with the
Defendants. R. 12-13. The Doe Defendants were never identified by the Vaughns.
Maple Oaks and Hoggan filed a Counterclaim, alleging that the Vaughns did not own,
and had never owned, the Road Right-of-Way (which the contract required be dedicated to
Bountiful City), and sought an award rescinding the contract due to a mutual mistake of fact.
R. 33-35. Alternatively, Maple Oaks and Hoggan alleged that the Vaughns had breached the
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contract. R. 35-37. Defendants also filed a Counterclaim and a Third-Party Complaint,
naming Bountiful City and seeking a decree that the Road Right-of-Way was a public street
owned by the City. R. 37-38.
Thereafter, Bountiful City filed a separate quiet title action against the Vaughns,
Maple Oaks, Hoggan, and others, seeking a decree quieting title to the Road Right-of-Way in
the City (Davis County Civil No. 94-0700375-QT). R. 344, 369-70. Bountiful City also
moved to dismiss the Third-Party Complaint, on the grounds that the Third-Party Complaint
did not assert any claim that Bountiful City was liable for any claim of Plaintiff, and that
Bountiful had initiated a separate quiet title action, which was a more appropriate forum for
the resolution of the title issues. R. 344. The Vaughns did not plead any claim against
Bountiful City in this action.
C.

Disposition Below.

Maple Oaks and Hoggan moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
contract had been rescinded by the Vaughns prior to the filing of the suit; therefore, the
Vaughns could not maintain an action for damages or specific performance. R. 60-61.
Alternatively, Maple Oaks and Hoggan sought summary judgment on the ground that the
contract should be rescinded due to a mutual mistake of fact as to the Vaughns' ownership of
the Road Right-of-Way. R. 60-61.
The Vaughns moved for partial summary judgment against Maple Oaks and Hoggan,
seeking judgment that there was no "mutually agreed contract rescission," that there was no
mutual mistake of fact, that there was an enforceable contract, and that the Vaughns owned
fee simple title to the Road Right-of-Way. R. 255-56.
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After a hearing, the District Court granted Maple Oaks' and Hoggan's motion for
summary judgment, on the ground that the contract had been rescinded by the Vaughns on
August 16, 1994, and the Vaughns could not, therefore, assert claims for specific
performance or damages based upon the contract. R. 346-50. Based upon the Court's
granting of the summary judgment motion, and Bountiful City's filing of the quiet title
action, Maple Oaks and Hoggan moved to dismiss their Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint, without prejudice. R. 351-52. The Vaughns then moved to consolidate this
action with Bountiful City's quiet title action. R. 369-70. The Vaughns also filed a motion
for summary judgment against Bountiful City (although no claim had been pled by the
Vaughns against Bountiful City), requesting a determination that the City was estopped to
claim and/or had waived any claim that the Vaughns did not own the Road Right-of-Way and
that the Vaughns owned fee simple title to the parcel, subject only to an undedicated right-ofway in favor of the City. R. 404-06.
After further proceedings, the District Court entered an order, dated March 29, 1995,
granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment, denying the Vaughns' motion to
consolidate, denying Defendants' motion for attorneys' fees, granting Defendants' motion for
voluntary dismissal of the Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (without prejudice), and
dismissing the Vaughns' claims against John Does 1-5 (without prejudice). R. 425-27. The
order disposed of all of the claims of all of the parties.
D.

Statement of Facts.

For purposes of the Vaughns' appeal, the material and undisputed facts are as
follows. In 1978, the plat for the Indian Springs Estates Plat "A," was recorded in the
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Office of the County Recorder of Davis Qounty. R. 64, 132. The Vaughns acquired Lot 8
of the subdivision in November 1990. R. 64, 73, 132. The Road Right-of-Way lies
immediately to the north of Lot 8, and is designated on the subdivision plat as "Road Right
of Way." R. 64, Ex. "A" to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Ex. "A" is not
paginated in the record). Maple Oaks, L.C., owns the parcel of real estate to the east of the
Road Right of Way. R. 64, 79.
On March 9, 1994, the Vaughns and Maple Oaks and Hoggan entered into the
Agreement. R. 7, 23, 65. The fundamental objective of the Agreement was to grant an
additional access to Maple Oaks' development across the Road Right-of-Way, which was
believed to be owned by the Vaughns. R. 15, 65, 79, 132. The Agreement specifically
recites that the Vaughns owned the parcel that was to be used as the Road Right-of-Way. R.
15.
Commencing on approximately July 20, 1994, the Vaughns asserted that Maple Oaks
and Hoggan breached the Agreement by failing to perform various duties and obligations
thereunder. R. 65, 80, 132. On or about August 17, 1994, John Clark, a member of Maple
Oaks, received a copy of a letter from David Cook, counsel for the Vaughns. R. 65-66, 75,
133. On or about August 30, 1994, Kent Hoggan, also a member of Maple Oaks, received
the same letter, together with a check from the Vaughns for $5,000. R. 65-66, 75, 84-85,
133. The letter was dated August 16, 1994. The letter stated:
Associated Title advises no funds were deposited by you for Vaughns
by the close of business on August 15, 1994 and further advises Bountiful
City's bond requirement has not yet been satisfied.
Vaughns advise you have not met the requirements of the letters to you dated
July 28, 1994 and August 10, 1994 regarding contract performance.
5

Therefore, at the request of Robert L. and G. Jean Vaughn, herewith is
the Vaughn's check no. 5026 in the sum of $5,000.00, constituting the return
of the sum you paid Vaughns pursuant to the referenced Agreement.
Said Agreement is hereby declared rescinded for breach on your part.
The Vaughns will proceed with flag lot development.
By copy of this letter Associated Title Company is requested to return
to the Vaughns the deed to a portion of Vaughn's Lot 8, Indian Springs Estate,
Plat A.
R. 84-85.
Maple Oaks and Hoggan continued to negotiate with the Vaughns and their counsel in
hopes of resolving the differences of the parties. R. 66, 75, 134. These discussions
continued until approximately September 7, 1994. R. 66, 75, 80, 134. No agreement was
reached. R. 66, 75, 80, 134. At no time during the discussions, or by any other means, did
the Vaughns or their counsel withdraw their stated rescission of the Agreement as set forth in
Mr. Cook's letter of August 16. R. 66, 75, 80, 134.
In their brief, the Vaughns assert that they consented to continued performance under
the contract by Maple Oaks and Hoggan, and requested that their $5,000 check be returned.
Vaughns' Brief at pp. 2, 11, and 18. The record does not support those assertions. First, in
moving for summary judgment, Maple Oaks and Hoggan specifically alleged that after the
rescission on August 16, 1994, no agreement was reached by the parties and the Vaughns
had not withdrawn rescission of the Agreement. R. 66. The Vaughns' response did not
deny the allegations, but asserted that the Defendants had broken off negotiations, refused to
continue discussions, and, after the suit was filed, commenced construction of a road on the
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Road Right-of-Way. R. 134. Accordingly, the statement of undisputed facts was deemed
admitted.

Rule 4-501(2)(b), Utah Code of Judicial Admin.

Secondly, the Vaughns' citations to the record do not support their present assertions;
contrariwise, the record is clear that no further agreement was reached, and the Vaughns'
never retracted the August 16th rescission. For example, David Cook's letter of August 22,
1994 (which Vaughns now claim asked for a return of the check), was in no fashion a
retraction of the rescission. R. 292-96. To the contrary, the letter stated that if Maple Oaks
and Hoggan consented to additional terms, including agreeing to mediate the Vaughns'
damage claim and pay liquidated damages if work was not done by a specified date, then the
contract could be reinstated.1 R. 294-96. Mr. Cook's letter stated that the new terms could
be accepted only be the Defendants' execution of the letter and the return of the Vaughns'
check. R. 295. There was never any agreement to those terms, the letter was never signed
by Maple Oaks and Hoggan, and the check was not returned.
Mr. Cook's letter of September 8, 1994, which recites the sequence of negotiations
from the Vaughns' perspective, confirms that the Agreement had been rescinded, that no
subsequent agreement to continue the contract had been reached, and that the Vaughns' offer
to reinstate the contract (as set forth in Mr. Cook's letter of August 22, 1994) was not

1

In pertinent part, Mr. Cook's letter stated: "Based on that representation,
Vaughns are willing to extend your time for performance of the March 9, 1994 Agreement in
respect to getting Vaughns a building permit by posting the City request bond to August 31,
1994, at the close of business if you will agree to the matters below referred to and indicate
your agreement by signing and returning a copy of this letter." R. 294.
7

accepted. R. 233-46. There was no dispute in the District Court on that issue, and there is
no present dispute established by the record.
On September 15, 1994, Mr. Cook telephoned Defendant's counsel, Bryce Panzer,
advised that the Vaughns were filing a lawsuit, and asked if he was authorized to accept
service of the complaint on behalf of the Defendants. R. 66, 92, 132. On September 16,
1994, Mr. Panzer faxed a letter to Mr. Cook, advising Mr. Cook that he could accept
service, and further stating, inter alia, the following:
Maple Oaks and Kent Hoggan have also asked me to advise you that
they agree that the Agreement, dated March 9, 1994, should be rescinded, and
accept the rescission of Agreement as stated in your letter of August 16, 1994.
In case your clients have done something else with the funds backing the
Vaughns' check no. 5026, Maple Oaks will not attempt to cash the check for
five days from the date of the letter.
While my clients accept rescission of the Agreement as an appropriate
resolution for both parties, we certainly disagree with the basis for rescission
set forth in your letter. As we have discussed from time to time, my clients
believe that they have not breached the agreement with the Vaughns.
Our research on the title to the property that was to be conveyed and/or
dedicated by the Vaughns for use as a Bountiful City road discloses that the
Vaughns do not have title to the road right of way, nor do we believe they
even have a colorable claim to title. Accordingly, rescission of the agreement
is appropriate based upon a mutual mistake of fact and/or failure of
consideration.
R. 66-67, 92, 95-96, 132.
On or about September 22, 1994, the Vaughns' check returning the $5,000 was
deposited in Maple Oaks' bank account, and the check was paid by the drawee bank. R. 67,
80, 132. Maple Oaks and Kent Hoggan received no benefits from the Vaughns under the
Agreement. R. 67, 80, 134. As of the date of the rescission, August 16, 1994, and upon
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the tender by Vaughns of the $5,000 that had been paid to them, the parties had been
restored to their respective pre-contract positions.
On September 16, 1994, the Vaughns commenced this action by filing the Complaint.
R. 1-6. Paragraph 19 of the Complaint states:
By reason of Defendants [sic] breach of said Agreement of the parties as set
forth in paragraph 9 above, and Defendants [sic] failure to remedy said breach
within any of the times orally promised by and on behalf of Defendants,
Vaughns have declared said contract rescinded and have returned to
Defendants said sum of $5,000.00 Defendants paid Vaughns under the terms
of said Agreement.
R. 4. The Complaint sought specific performance, damages, or a decree validating the
Vaughns' rescission of the Agreement. R. 5.
On September 22, 1994, Maple Oaks commenced construction of a road across the
Road Right-of-Way. R. 36, 272. The Vaughns filed an Amended Complaint on October 3,
1994, which dropped the allegation that the contract had been rescinded and the cause of
action for rescission. R. 7-21.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Having rescinded the contract, the Vaughns are precluded from asserting a claim for
specific performance of the Agreement, or for damages from Maple Oaks' and Hoggan's
alleged breach of the contract. Assuming that the Maple Oaks and Hoggan had breached the
Agreement, the contractual relationship of the parties terminated on August 16, 1994, when
the Vaughns elected to rescind and tendered the payment they had received. The
acquiescence or consent of Maple Oaks and Hoggan was not required in order for Vaughns'
rescission to be effective, as no new agreement was being substituted for the contract. There
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was no further agreement reached between the parties, and thus no contract for the District
Court to enforce.
The District Court resolved all pending motions and issues before the Court. The
Vaughns' claim that Maple Oaks and Hoggan were estopped to deny Vaughns' title to the
Road Right-of-Way was simply irrelevant in light of rescission of the contract. Summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants, and dismissal of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint,
necessarily constituted denial of Vaughns' motion for partial summary judgment on that
issue, and on the further issue of whether Maple Oaks and Hoggan were "estopped" from
"accepting" rescission.
The District Court's denial of Vaughns' motion to consolidate this action with
Bountiful City's quiet title action was not an abuse of the Court's discretion; contrariwise, it
was the most economical method of resolving the disputes between the parties.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
HAVING RESCINDED THE AGREEMENT, THE VAUGHNS MAY
NOT SUE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OR DAMAGES
Having availed themselves of the remedy of rescinding the Agreement, the Vaughns
are precluded from thereafter seeking to enforce the Agreement or recover damages for
alleged breaches. The Vaughns confuse different legal theories in their attempt to negate the
effect of their decision to rescind the Agreement. Maple Oaks and Hoggan do not claim that
the parties entered into an accord and satisfaction. Accordingly, the issues of whether Maple
Oaks and Hoggan consented to the rescission or are estopped from acquiescing to rescission
are irrelevant to the question of whether the Vaughns rescinded the Agreement. The
10

undisputed facts establish that the Vaughns rescinded the contract, thus precluding a lawsuit
for specific performance or damages.
By David Cook's letter of August 16, and the concomitant delivery of the $5,000 paid
by Maple Oaks, the Vaughns brought the contractual relationship of the parties to an end. If
the Vaughns' allegations of breach are correct, nothing further was required of them, or of
the Defendants, for the Agreement to be rescinded.
The Vaughns' act of rescission is known as "rescission at law," as distinguished from
equitable rescission.
If the plaintiff has adequate substantive grounds for avoiding the transaction,
his notice to the defendant that he has done so, accompanied by restoration to
the defendant of benefits received by the plaintiff in the transaction, will itself
amount to a rescission. This is called rescission at law, meaning rescission
under the theory of rescission used in law, rather than equity, courts. The
theory here is that the court has nothing to do with the rescission of the
transaction; that is accomplished by the plaintiff when he notifies the defendant
and returns what he received under the transaction. Once the plaintiff has
rescinded, he is entitled to recover back what he gave under the contract. If
the defendant does not give it back voluntarily, the plaintiff may sue for it in
the same way he may sue for any other property in the hands of the defendant,
for instance, by suing in replevin to recover goods he transferred to defendant
and which, upon rescission, once again belong to him, or by suing in
assumpsit for money so transferred. Thus the court in cases of rescission "at
law" does not effect the rescission and the court's only role is to get back the
plaintiffs property or its value.
Dobbs on Remedies. §4.8 (1973). Citing Dobbs, the Utah Supreme Court has held:
Rescission at law is accomplished without the aid of a court. It is completed
when, having grounds justifying rescission, one party to a contract notifies the
other party that he intends to rescind the contract and returns that which he
received under the contract. The rescinding party may then go into court to
obtain assistance in recovering his property or value from the other party. On
the other hand, actions brought asking a court to rescind a contract are actions
in equity.
Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 n.5 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted).
11

Having availed themselves of the remedy of rescission (and Maple Oaks and Hoggan
having received no benefits under the Agreement that they were required to restore to the
Vaughns), the Vaughns are not entitled to another remedy, such as specific performance of
the contract.
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an
action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where there has
been a material breach of the contract by the other party.
Polvglvcoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979).
The Vaughns claim that the agreement of both parties was required in order for the
rescission to be effective. The Vaughns confuse accord and satisfaction with the remedy of
rescission. As set forth in Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah
1987), and similar cases, a mutual rescission is merely another contract, requiring offer,
acceptance and a meeting of the minds. Mutual agreement is not required where rescission
is asserted as a remedy for material breach.
The Vaughns also assert an estoppel theory, to the effect that they relied to their
detriment upon promises by Maple Oaks and Hoggan, made after the rescission, that they
would continue to perform on the Agreement, and that the Defendants should not be
permitted to thereafter "accept" the Vaughns' rescission of the Agreement. There is no
dispute that discussions and negotiations took place between August 16 and September 7,
when discussions ceased; however, there is also no dispute that no agreement was reached.
At no time during the negotiations did the Vaughns withdraw their rescission of the
contract. David Cook's letter of August 22, 1994, conditions withdrawal of the rescission on
terms never agreed to by the Defendants. R. 293-96. Mr. Cook's letter of September 8,
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1994, which recites the events from the Vaughns' perspective, details the absence of a
further agreement or reinstatement of the contract. R. 233-46. The Vaughns' Complaint,
filed after all negotiations had terminated, expressly alleged that the Agreement had been
rescinded. R. 4. The Vaughns' estoppel theory does not make any sense, either on the facts
or under the law. The Agreement was terminated when it was rescinded by the Vaughns,
and later negotiations, which admittedly bore no fruit, neither revived the Agreement nor
created any new contract between the parties.
Finally, the Vaughns argue that Maple Oaks and Hoggan are precluded from
"accepting" the Vaughns' rescission of the Agreement because they proceeded to cut the road
across the Road Right-of-Way. The road construction commenced on September 22, 1994,
after this suit had been filed. As no acceptance of the Vaughns' rescission is required in
order for it to be effective, the argument is immaterial.
To the extent the Vaughns' argument is a claim that Maple Oaks and Hoggan received
something under the Agreement that ought to be restored to the Vaughns, the theory is
simply not supported by the facts. The road construction was not based upon or pursuant to
any agreement with the Vaughns. The road construction occurred after the contract was
rescinded, after all negotiations had ceased, after the lawsuit had been filed, and after Maple
Oaks and Hoggan had advised the Vaughns that they agreed the contract should be rescinded.
As of the date of rescission, August 16, there is no question that the Defendants had not
received any benefits under the contract that had to be restored to the Vaughns in order for
the parties to be restored to their pre-contract positions. After the rescission, the Vaughns
had all the rights they had before the Agreement was signed to proceed with development of
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their lot, and Maple Oaks and Hoggan had no claim against the Road Right-of-Way arising
under the Agreement.
If anything is obvious in this case, it is that the Vaughns regret having rescinded the
Agreement. Plaintiffs' remorse, however, does not revive a rescinded agreement.2
POINT H
THE DISTRICT COURT RESOLVED ALL PENDING MOTIONS AND ISSUES.
The Vaughns argue that the trial court erred by not ruling on their motion for partial
summary judgment. By granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and ordering
that the Vaughns could not seek enforcement of the contract they rescinded, the Court
necessarily denied the Vaughns' motion for partial summary judgment. The denial was
appropriate.
Vaughns moved for partial summary judgment against Maple Oaks and Hoggan,
seeking judgment that there was no "mutually agreed contract rescission," that there was no
mutual mistake of fact, that there was an enforceable contract, and that the Vaughns owned
fee simple title to the Road Right-of-Way. R. 255-56. The "mutually agreed contract
rescission" claim was expressly denied by Judge Memmott's determination that the Vaughns
had rescinded the Agreement. R. 346-49. The mutual mistake of fact theory was mooted by
the Court's ruling on Plaintiffs' rescission. The Court held that there was no enforceable
contract. R. 346-49. The Court properly refused to rule that the Vaughns owned fee simple

2

Should the Court determine that summary judgment was improperly granted to
Maple Oaks and Hoggan, Defendants retain their claim that the Agreement should be
rescinded due to mutual mistake of fact, and the alternative claim for damages from
Plaintiffs' breach of contract.
14

title to the Road Right-of-Way, both because the claim was not pled in the Amended
Complaint and because no claim had been asserted by the Vaughns against Bountiful City.3
With the dismissal of the claims against John Does 1-5 (as to which the Vaughns do not
complain), there were no claims pled by the Vaughns that had not been disposed of by
specific ruling of the District Court.
POINT ffl
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
CONSOLIDATE THIS MATTER WITH BOUNTIFUL CITY'S QUIET TITLE SUIT.
The Vaughns argue that the District Court should have consolidated this action with
the quiet title lawsuit filed by Bountiful City. The Vaughns' motion to consolidate was filed
after the District Court had ruled that Maple Oaks' and Hoggan's motion for summary
judgment would be granted, and after Defendants' moved for voluntary dismissal of their
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. R. 346-49, 351-52, 369-70. Thus, the Vaughns
were asking the District Court to consolidate a case in which there were no claims remaining
against any known parties, with a case that had just commenced.
The District Court is vested with the discretion to decide whether to consolidate suits
under Utah R. Civ. P. 42(a). Slusher v. OspitaL 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989); Raggenbuck v.
Suhrmann. 325 P.2d 258 (Utah 1958). The Vaughns fail to show that the District Court
abused its discretion, or that they suffered any prejudice whatsoever from the denial of the
motion. In fact, the Vaughns probably benefitted from the refusal to consolidate, as they

3

There was never any claim by Maple Oaks or Hoggan that they owned the
Road Right-of-Way, but merely that Bountiful City owned it and that it was a public street.
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were then free to appeal the rescission of contract issue, which was separate and apart from
the ownership of the Road Right-of-Way.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
DATED this 93_ day of August, 1995.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Bryce D./Panzer
Attorneys tor Defendants
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I hereby certify that I served the foregoing by mailing, by first class mail, two copies
thereof to David S. Cook, Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants Robert L. Vaughn and G. Jeanie
Vaughn, 85 West 400 North, Bountiful, Utah 84010, and to Russell L. Mahan, Attorney for
Third-Party Defendant Bountiful City, 790 South 1st East, Bountiful, Utah 84011 this q c f ^
day of August, 1995.
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